Europe is buying record amounts of Russian LNG

In March, Europe imported more Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) than ever before—ironically, just before new restrictions on short-term LNG contracts took effect. This once again highlights the stark contradiction between the EU’s political goals and the realities of energy policy.

The EU faces a difficult balancing act. On the one hand, it wants to further reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies. On the other hand, it must ensure that industry, households, and storage facilities have sufficient gas. Since the loss of large portions of previous pipeline supplies, energy costs in Europe have risen significantly. The situation was further exacerbated recently because gas storage levels were low at the start of the refilling season, and at the same time, deliveries from Qatar were disrupted.

Against this backdrop, European utilities increasingly turned to Russian LNG in March. According to data from the organization Urgewald, which is based on vessel tracking data from Kpler, the EU imported approximately 2.45 to 2.46 billion cubic meters of Russian LNG in March 2026. That was about 20 percent more than in February and roughly 38 to 40 percent more than in the same month last year.

Record purchases ahead of new restrictions

On April 25, new EU restrictions took effect prohibiting short-term import contracts for Russian LNG. Shortly before that, European energy companies secured particularly large volumes once again. In March alone, 25 cargoes from the Yamal LNG project operated by Novatek were fully unloaded at European terminals.

A similar pattern had already emerged in February. At that time, all LNG shipments from Yamal went to the EU—21 out of 21 cargoes. In January, 23 out of 25 shipments from Yamal were unloaded at European ports. In the first quarter of 2026, the EU received 69 of the 71 global Yamal shipments. This corresponds to 97 percent of the project’s production.

According to estimates, Europe paid around 2.88 billion euros for LNG from Yamal in the first quarter. That amounts to about 32 million euros per day. China, which has been established in recent years as an alternative buyer for Russian LNG, received only two shipments in January and none in February or March.

Why the market was stronger than politics

The main reason for the high imports lies in the price and supply shock on the energy markets. The European TTF gas price rose from around 35 euros per megawatt-hour in January and February to 52.87 euros in March. At the same time, uncertainties regarding supplies from the Gulf region intensified.

Qatar had to curtail parts of its LNG production, while global supply chains for liquefied natural gas also came under pressure. The U.S. is now Europe’s most important LNG supplier, but it sells a large portion of its volumes flexibly on the world market. As a result, Europe competes directly with Asian buyers, who often offer higher prices during tight market conditions. Several LNG tankers originally destined for Europe were recently rerouted to Asia.

Russian LNG thus remained one of the few reliable sources for European buyers in the short term. Traders and utilities secured additional volumes before the new rules took effect to limit supply and price risks. In March alone, European purchases of Russian LNG totaled around 1.33 billion euros.

Europe’s Role in the Yamal System

This dependence is not merely a matter of consumption. European companies also play a key role in the logistics of the Yamal project. Of the 14 Arc7 ice-class tankers used for transport from the Arctic, eleven are operated by companies from the UK and Greece.

Added to this are European port infrastructure, insurance, maintenance capabilities, and long-term supply contracts. Urgewald summarizes this as follows: Europe is not only a buyer but also a central component of the project’s operational structure.

In March, Yamal LNG reached a production level of 3.3 million tons—a 13 percent increase over the previous year. The short distance from the Arctic port of Sabetta to European terminals enables rapid turnaround times. Each shipment to Europe takes an average of just over eight days. This access is particularly important for the project, especially during the winter months.

France remains the largest buyer

In 2025, France was the largest EU buyer of Russian LNG. The country accounted for 41.7 percent of EU imports. A total of 87 tankers delivered approximately 6.3 million tons of Russian LNG to the French ports of Dunkirk and Montoir.

Belgium also played a key role. The port of Zeebrugge received 58 ships carrying 4.2 million tons, importing more Yamal LNG than China alone.

The French energy company TotalEnergies holds a 20 percent stake in the Yamal LNG project and purchases around 4 million tons annually. This makes the company one of the project’s most important individual customers.

The replacement problem remains unresolved

The EU intends to phase out Russian LNG imports. The ban on short-term contracts has been in effect since April 25. Long-term contracts, which account for the majority of European Yamal deliveries, are set to be affected starting January 1, 2027.

This leaves Europe facing a significant replacement problem. Starting in 2027, around 15 million tons of Russian Arctic LNG would need to be replaced. At the same time, alternative supply sources are limited. The U.S. supplies large volumes, but Europe faces competition from Asia there. Qatar currently plays only a limited role as a reliable additional supplier.

For Russia, too, the loss of the European market would be difficult to compensate for. Studies suggest that existing tanker capacity is insufficient to divert Yamal volumes to Asia on the same scale. Without access to European ports, annual deliveries from Yamal could drop significantly.

Over the past four years, Europe has paid more than $230 billion for Russian oil and gas imports. Many contracts still have a long way to run, some extending into the 2040s. Politically, the EU is pursuing a phase-out of Russian energy. However, the market demonstrated once again in March that this phase-out is significantly more difficult than the decisions would suggest.